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Abstract. Many models in economics involve probabilistic choices
where each decision-maker selects the best alternative from a finite set. Viewing
the value of each alternative as a random variable, the analyst is then interested
in the choice probabilities, that is, the probability for an alternative to give the
maximum value. Much analytical power can be gained, both for positive and
normative analysis, if the maximum value is statistically independent of which
alternative obtains the highest value. This note synthesizes and generalizes
previous results on this invariance property. We provide characterizations of
the property within a wide class of distributions that comprises the McFadden
GEV class, show implications in several directions, and establish connections
with copulas. We illustrate the usefulness of the invariance property by way of
a few examples.
Keywords: Choice, random utility, extreme value, leader-maximum, in-
variance, independence.
JEL codes: C10, C25, D01.
This note characterizes, within certain much-used function classes, those multi-
variate probability distributions that have a certain remarkable and useful invariance
property that can be informally described as follows. Consider a population of con-
sumers who face a finite set of alternatives, say, lunch restaurants. At each time a
choice is made, the consumer chooses exactly one of the restaurants; he or she is well
informed and chooses the one that she finds best. Her choice of restaurant will result
in an experienced utility. Let us now compare the experienced utility distributions
at the restaurants. The invariance property holds if these distributions are the same
for all restaurants. In a statistical sense then, people are thus just as satisfied in one
restaurant as in another. The reason why such invariance may even be a possibility
is that consumers make voluntary and well-informed choices. The randomness is only
in the eyes of the outside observer, who does not know every individual’s preferences,
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only the population distribution of preferences. Imagine that one restaurant improves
its food quality or services and/or reduces its prices, and assume that all consumers
are informed of this change. Some consumers will then switch to this restaurant from
the one they used to go to. The ones who are most eager to do this are those who
were least happy at their original restaurant, which they before found to be the best,
but no longer so. Since the least happy left, average experienced utility of those who
remain in their usual restaurants goes up. If the invariance property holds, the new
utility distributions, among clients in the restaurants after one improved its services,
will again be identical across restaurants, but now at a higher level.
The invariance property leads to analytical simplification in many applications
including discrete choice with an outside option, rent seeking, innovation contests,
patent races, and auctions, see Section 3. First, however, Section 1 provides general
definitions and some preliminaries. Our main results are presented in Section 2.
Section 4 discusses a number of earlier contributions.
1. Definitions and preliminaries
Let N be the positive integers, R be the reals and R+ the non-negative reals. Denote
by F the class of cumulative distribution functions such that  : R → [0 1] for some
integer   1 and some nonempty and closed (bounded or unbounded) interval ⊆ R
such that  is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on ⊆ R and has positive density 
with support . For convenience we will subsequently refer to  as "the support".
Let X = (1 ) be a random vector distributed according to some such  .
(We write vectors in bold-face.) Let ˆ = max  be the maximum of the random
vector and let ˆ denote its c.d.f.. We write  for the partial derivative of  with
respect to its  variable and  () for the  marginal distribution of the multivariate
distribution  . Define the selection  ∈  = {1  } by  = argmax , where the
latter set with probability one is a singleton. Let  =  ( = ). One may also
consider the distribution of the maximum conditional on the selection of a particular
alternative  ∈  : ˆ () () = 
³
ˆ ≤  |  = 
´
. In a discrete-choice setting, ˆ ()
is the distribution of achieved (or experienced) utility, conditional on the choice of
alternative  ∈  , and  is its choice probability.
It is relatively straight-forward in this setting to prove the following three equali-
ties:1 ⎧
⎨
⎩
 = R  (  )  ∀ ∈ 
ˆ () () = −1 ·
R 
−∞  (  )  ∀ ∈   ∈ R
ˆ () =  (  ) ∀ ∈ R
(1)
We note that   0 for all  ∈  , and that the quantities in (1) only depend on
how the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.)  ∈ F behaves near the diagonal
of its domain. By “invariance” we mean that the conditional distributions ˆ () are
identical across alternatives  ∈  :
1See e.g. Lindberg, Eriksson and Mattsson (1995, Lemma 1). The general case is more complex,
see Lindberg (2012).
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Definition 1. Amultivariate distribution  has the Invariance Property if ˆ () =
ˆ for all  ∈  . A random vector X has the Invariance Property if its distribution
has the Invariance Property.
The following proposition, stated without proof, provides some immediate con-
clusions regarding the Invariance Property. We use the notational convention that a
univariate function applied to a vector is applied to each component of the vector.
Proposition 1. Consider a random vector X with c.d.f.  ∈ F .
(i) If  are i.i.d. then X has the Invariance Property.
(ii) If X has the Invariance Property and  : R → R is a strictly increasing
function, then  (X) has the Invariance Property.
(iii) X has the Invariance Property if and only if the selection  and the maximum
ˆ are independent.
We will express results in terms of so-called copulas. These are functions on the
unit cubes in Euclidean spaces, defined as follows (see Nelsen, 2006, for an excellent
introduction):
Definition 2. A copula is any function  : [0 1] → [0 1] such that
(i)  (x) = 0 if Π∈ = 0,
(ii)  (x) =  if Π∈\{} = 1,
(iii) If xy ∈ [0 1] and x ≤ y, then  ([xy]) ≥ 0.
Here [xy] denotes the box ×=1 [ ] ⊆ [0 1] and  ([xy]) is the -volume
of this box, defined as the signed sum of the values  (v) at all vertices v of [xy],
where the sign is positive (negative) if  =  for an even (odd) number of coordinates
 ∈  . Condition (iii) ensures that the copula assigns non-negative probability mass
to any box. By construction, copulas are then c.d.f.s on the unit cube that have
uniform marginal distributions.
By Sklar’s theorem (e.g. Theorem 2.10.9 in Nelsen, 2006), every multivariate
distribution  : R → [0 1] can be written in terms of its marginal distributions  ()
and a copula , so that
 (x) =  ¡ (1) (1)    () ()¢ ∀x ∈ R (2)
The copula associated with any c.d.f. thus captures the statistical dependence struc-
ture of the multivariate distribution in question.
In order to state our main result we define the class of copulas that are associ-
ated with multivariate extreme-value (MEV) distributions, to be calledMEV copulas.
A multivariate extreme-value (MEV) distribution is any multivariate distribution 
with non-degenerate margins for which there exist an i.i.d. sequence of random
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vectors, (X)∈N, all distributed according to some multivariate c.d.f.  , and nor-
malizing vectors ab ∈ R for each  ∈ N such that all components of all vectors
a are positive and, with component-wise maximization, multiplication and division,
lim→∞ 
µ
max1≤≤X − b
a
≤ x
¶
= lim→∞ [ (ax+ b)]
 =  (x)
(see Joe, 1997).2 MEV copulas can be shown to be exactly those copulas that satisfy
the following homogeneity property
 (1   ) = [ (1  )] ∀x ∈ (0 1) , ∀  0
This follows from
Lemma 1. A copula  is a copula of an MEV distribution if and only if it is of the
form
 (x) = exp (− (− lnx)) (3)
for some linearly homogenous function .
(All proofs are given in the Appendix.) We note that if X = (1 ) is MEV
distributed, then so is any subvector of . Hence, the copulas of the subvectors also
have the form (3).
Lemma 2. For  ⊂  , let X = ()∈ and similarly for x . Let () (x) =
lim→+∞ ∀∈  (x). If X is MEV-distributed with c.d.f. of the form (2) with copula of the form (3), then X has the c.d.f.
 () (x) = exp
³
−() ¡− ln () ()¢∈´ 
2. Results
The main result of this note is the following theorem, which generalizes previous
results, see Mattsson, Weibull and Lindberg (2014) and Section 4.
Theorem 1. Consider any  ∈ F such that  (x) =  ¡ (1) (1)    () ()¢ ∀x ∈
R for some MEV copula  that is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on the unit
cube and has positive partial derivatives. Then  and all the multivariate marginal
distributions of  have the Invariance Property if and only if for each  ∈  there
exists an   0 such that  () = £ (1)¤ .
2More precisely, if X = (1 ), then max1≤≤X is the vector with  component
max1≤≤, and ax is the vector with  component .
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The condition that the marginal distributions are positive powers of each other
has special significance when the marginal distribution  (1) is standard extreme-value
type 1 (Gumbel). Then  () () = exp (− exp [−+ ln]), meaning that the marginal
distributions are identical up to a location shift. An MEV distribution with type 1
margins is the basis of the well-known logit family of models, pioneered by McFadden
(1974, 1978, 1981).
Theorem 1 characterizes the Invariance Property for those distributions in F that
have twice continuously diﬀerentiable MEV copulas. Could it be that invariance of a
probability distribution is equivalent to the distribution having an MEV copula and
marginal distributions that are powers of each other? That conjecture is false because,
among other things, invariance depends only on the properties of the distribution on
the diagonal  = {x ∈  : 1 =  = } of its support:
Proposition 2. Consider any distributions  ˜ ∈ F with the same support . If
 has the Invariance Property and ˜ =  on an open neighborhood of , then also
˜ has the Invariance Property.
The next proposition shows that the Invariance Property is preserved under ag-
gregation of components to blocks represented by their maximal member.
Proposition 3. Suppose that X = (1 ) has the Invariance Property, and
consider any partition of  into  subsets . For each subset  let  = max∈ ().
Then Y = (1  ) has the Invariance Property.
3. Applications
This section discusses a number of economics contexts in which the Invariance Prop-
erty is useful. Throughout we rely on the equivalence of the Invariance Property to
the independence of the selection  and the maximum ˆ.
3.1. Discrete choice with outside option. The probabilistic basis of a discrete
choice model is a random vector X of (indirect) utilities, each associated with an
alternative  ∈  . The decision-maker, or, as we will here say, the consumer, chooses
the alternative with the highest utility. Such a discrete choice model is also embedded
in models of monopolistic competition (Sattinger, 1984; Perloﬀ and Salop, 1985). In
many applications, consumers also have an outside option. The utility associated
with the outside option acts as a threshold such that the consumer only chooses one
of the alternatives in  if the utility of that alternative exceeds that of the outside
option. We shall see that such situations are easily treated when the random utilities
have the Invariance Property. This seems not to have been observed before.
Suppose then that X has the Invariance Property, and that alternative  is chosen
if  = ˆ and ˆ  0, where 0 is the random utility of the outside option, which
we take to be statistically independent from X. Let 0 be the c.d.f. of 0. We
still use  to denote the alternative in  = {1  } with maximum utility and 
to denote the probability that  = . The outside option is labelled  = 0, and
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 ∈ {0} ∪  denotes the chosen option among all options. The probability for the
outside option is
 ( = 0) = 
³
ˆ ≤ 0
´
=
Z
 (  ) 0 () 
a probability that can be calculated from the primitives of the model.
It follows fromProposition 1 (iii) that, for any  ∈  and  ∈ R, 
³
 =  | ˆ  
´
=
 and thus
 ( = ) = 
³
 =  ∧ ˆ  0
´
=
Z

³
 =  | ˆ  
´
· 
³
ˆ  
´
0 ()
=  · [1−  ( = 0)] 
Hence, the presence of an outside option does not aﬀect the probabilities of the inside
options, conditional on the outside option not being chosen.
3.2. Rent-seeking, innovation contests and patent races. Baye and Hoppe
(2003) establish the strategic equivalence between wide classes of rent-seeking games,
innovation contests and patent-races. In their innovation-contest game,  firms com-
pete by employing a finite and positive number of scientists, where each scientist costs
  0 and independently produces an innovation of a random value with c.d.f.  on
the unit interval. All firms pay the costs of their scientists, and the firm with the best
idea among all firms wins the value of its best idea. The other firms win nothing.
Let  be the value of firm ’s best idea and let X = (1 ). Then X has
the joint c.d.f.  (1  ) = Q=1  () (), where  () () = [ ()] and  is
the number of scientists at firm . Since  (x) = exp
³
−P=1− ln () ()´,  has
an MEV copula (by Lemma 1), so Theorem 1 applies. Hence,  has the Invariance
Property. By Proposition 1 (iii), the identity  ∈  of the firm that wins the contest
and the value ˆ of the best idea are statistically independent. Hence, the expected
profit to firm  from hiring  ∈ N scientists can be expressed as
 (1 ) =  ( = ) · (ˆ)−  ·
where, since all scientists have the same probability of producing the best innovation,
 ( = ) =  for  = 1 + +, and
(ˆ) =
1Z
0
 (ˆ  ) = 1−
1Z
0
ˆ () = 1−
1Z
0
[()] 
Hence,
 (1 ) =
⎡
⎣ 1
⎛
⎝1−
1Z
0
[()] 
⎞
⎠− 
⎤
⎦ ·
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This setting can be generalized in several ways within our framework. The R&D
inputs  may be any positive real numbers, and the c.d.f.  may be defined on
any interval. Moreover, the marginal c.d.f.  () of the value of the best idea within
any firm  may be of the power form () for any positive increasing function 
of its R&D input . For example, an S-shaped such function could represent the
"synergy" or "critical mass" eﬀect that the marginal return (in terms of innovations
or discoveries) from an additional scientist may be highest at some intermediate size
of the research unit. Moreover, by using MEV copulas, one may allow for statistical
dependence among the values of the best ideas in the diﬀerent firms. It follows from
Lemma 1 that such an MEV copula is defined by a linearly homogenous function ,
and one obtains
 ( = ) =  () · (1 (1)    ()) (1 (1)    ())
from Theorem 1 in Mattsson, Weibull and Lindberg (2014), and (ˆ) can be derived
from the c.d.f. ˆ = (1(1)()) of ˆ. We conjecture that the results in Baye
and Hoppe (2003) can be generalized, by use of the invariance property, in many
important directions for a wide variety of innovation contests, patent races and rent-
seeking games.
3.3. Auctions. Following Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Krishna (2002) we
briefly consider auctions for an indivisible item in a situation where each bidder  ∈ 
has private information about the item for sale in the form of a random signal .
The signal vector X = (1 ) has positive dependence among the components,
formalized as aﬃliation (see Krishna, 2002). More precisely, assume that all signals
take values in some interval  ⊆ R+, and let  :  → [0 1] be the joint c.d.f. of
the signal vector X with density  :  → R+. The signals are (positively) aﬃliated
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982) if
 (x) ·  (y) ≤  (x ∨ y) ·  (x ∧ y)
for all xy ∈ .3 We now add the assumption that the distribution  of X takes
the form  (x) =  (Φ (1)1  Φ ()) for some MEV copula , univariate c.d.f.
Φ, and constants   0  ∈  . To the best of our knowledge, this assumption is
new to the auction literature.4 We proceed to show that it is useful.
A strategy for bidder  is any measurable function  : → R+ that maps bidder’s private signal  to a bid  (). We proceed to calculate the distribution and
expectation of the highest and second-highest bids for the case when all bidders use
3This property is known in the statistics literature as multivariate total positivity (MTP2) of the
density, see e.g. Karlin and Rinott (1980). See also Krishna (2002).
4Joe (1997) collects some results showing the relationship between aﬃliation and MEV copula.
If a density is 2 then all bivariate margins of the c.d.f. are max-infinitely divisible (Thm. 2.3,
2.5 and 2.6). Any MEV copula is max-infinitely divisible. Thus aﬃliation and MEV copula are
related concepts.
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the same strictly increasing strategy .5 The bidder with the highest signal, ˆ, then
makes the highest bid, (ˆ), and wins the auction. The distribution of the highest bid
is easy to obtain. Writing Ψ () for Φ £−1 ()¤,  for  (−1   −), and recalling
that  is an MEV copula, we find that the distribution of the maximum bid is

h

³
ˆ
´
≤ 
i
=  (Ψ ()1  Ψ ()) =  ¡−1(− lnΨ())  −(− lnΨ())¢
= − lnΨ() = exp [− (ln ) · lnΨ ()] = Ψ ()− ln  
The inverse of the c.d.f. of the highest bid 
³
ˆ
´
is the mapping → Ψ−1
³
− 1ln 
´
.
Hence, the expected maximum bid is6

h

³
ˆ
´i
=
Z 1
0
Ψ−1
³
− 1ln 
´
 =
Z 1
0

³
Φ−1
³
− 1ln 
´´

Writing  for  (−1   1  −), where − in position  is replaced by 1, it
is also straightforward to derive the distribution of the second highest bid, ˆ(2) (the
actual payment in a second-price auction):

h

³
ˆ(2)
´
≤ 
i
= 
h
ˆ ≤ −1 ()
i
+
+
X
=1
[ (Ψ ()1   1 Ψ ())−  (Ψ ()1  Ψ ())]
=
X
=1
Ψ ()− ln  − (− 1)Ψ ()− ln  
The expectation of the second highest bid is then

h

³
ˆ(2)
´i
=
Z ∞
0
Ã
1−
X
=1
Ψ ()− ln  + (− 1)Ψ ()− ln 
!

=
X
=1
Z ∞
0
h
1−Ψ ()− ln 
i
 − (− 1)
Z ∞
0
h
1−Ψ ()− ln 
i

=
X
=1
Z 1
0

³
Φ−1
³
− 1ln 
´´
− (− 1)
h

³
ˆ
´i

We thus have explicit expressions for the distribution and expectation of the highest
and second highest bids. By the Invariance Property, the probability distributions of
5Such monotonicity is known to hold in symmetric equilibria in sealed-bid first-price and second-
price auctions, see e.g. Krishna (2002).
6These equations follow from the fact that the expectation of any positive random variable 
with c.d.f.  can be written as the integral of 1−  () over  ∈ R+, or, when  has an inverse, of
−1 () over  ∈ [0 1].
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the highest and second-highest bids are independent of which bidder actually won.
We finally note that these derivations were made without any symmetry assump-
tion concerning the distribution of the signal vector . In particular, asymmetric
statistical dependency among bidders’ signals is permitted.
4. Previous literature
Researchers in economics and in probability theory have returned to the topic of
invariance a number of times. This section presents a summary and highlights how
our results are related to earlier results.
Strauss (1979, Theorem 5) claimed that if the components of a random vector X
are of the additive form  =  + , where the :s are scalars and Z is a random
vector with c.d.f.  , then the Invariance Property holds for all vectors ν if and only
if  (z) =  [ (−z)] for some positive homogenous function  (with positive degree)
and some function  : R+ → [0 1] such that  is a c.d.f.7 It is straightforward to
show that the subset of such functions  that are linearly homogenous corresponds
exactly to the set of  functions that generate MEV copulas (see Lemma 1). Strauss
(1979, Theorem 4) further showed that the multinomial logit model is the only addi-
tive random utility model with independent error terms  for which the Invariance
Property holds. Anas and Feng (1988) later showed that the multinomial logit model
has the weaker Invariance Property [ˆ] = [ˆ] for all  ∈  . This follows, however,
directly from Strauss (1979).
de Palma and Kilani (2007) also considered the additive random utility case with
independent error terms and reproved the above result by Strauss (1979), which
follows from his Theorem 4. They also proved the claim that for error terms that are
i.i.d. with finite expectation, the above weaker Invariance Property, [ˆ] = [ˆ]
for all  ∈  , is equivalent to the error terms being extreme-value type 1 (Gumbel)
distributed. The if-part is the same as the previous claim by Anas and Feng (1988).
Also Train and Wilson (2008) re-derived the Invariance Property for multino-
mial logit models. They used this property for maximum likelihood estimation in a
class of combined stated- and revealed-preference experiments, where each respon-
dent considered the same alternatives in both experiments and where the attributes
of the alternatives in the stated-preference experiments were varied on the basis of
the respondent’s revealed-preference choice.
Our Theorem 1 states that, for any multivariate distribution with MEV copula,
the Invariance Property holds for all multivariate marginal distributions if and only if
the univariate marginal distributions are positive powers of each other. A special case
of this result was given by Resnick and Roy (1990b) who showed that MEV distrib-
utions with Gumbel marginals have the Invariance Property. Mattsson, Weibull and
Lindberg (2014) generalized this to the "if" claim in the present Theorem 1. Resnick
and Roy (1990a) proved a special case of the "only if" claim in our Theorem 1,
7An incomplete proof of this claim was given in Robertson and Strauss (1981). Lindberg, Eriksson
and Mattsson (1995) completed the proof.
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namely that the Invariance Property for two independent non-negative random vari-
ables implies that their c.d.f.s are positive powers of each other. Mattsson, Weibull
and Lindberg (2014) generalized this to an arbitrary finite number of independent
random variables.
5. Appendix
Lemma 1 is essentially in Joe (1997) but his proof is incomplete.
Proof of Lemma 1. Necessity: Note with Joe (1997, p. 173-174) that an MEV
copula  must satisfy  (x) =  (x) for all x ∈ (0 1) and   0 Then  (y) ≡
− ln (−y) is linearly homogenous.
Suﬃciency: Suppose  has the form (2). Let  be a c.d.f. with copula  and
marginals that are unit exponential on the negative half-axis, i.e.  () =  on
(−∞ 0]. Then  (x) =  (x). Let X = (1  ) be i.i.d. with c.d.f.  , and
let  = max≤. Let Y =
¡1   ¢, then Y has the c.d.f.
 ¡Y ≤ x¢ =  £¡1   ¢ ≤ (1  )¤
= 
∙µ
max≤ 1 max≤ 
¶
≤
³1
  


´¸
=
Y
≤

h
(1  ) ≤
³1
  


´i
=  ¡1  ¢ =  (x) 
Thus all Y have the same distribution, and hence they converge in distribution to
Y1, say, with the same c.d.f.  (x). Therefore  (x) is the c.d.f. of an MEV
distribution, and  is an MEV copula.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suﬃciency: This follows from Theorem 1 in Mattsson,
Weibull and Lindberg (2014), combined with the observation in Lemma 2 that the
multivariate marginal distributions of MEV copulas are also MEV copulas, and that
twice diﬀerentiability with positive partials is inherited.
Necessity: Consider the c.d.f.  (1 ≤ 12 ≤ 2) =  (1 2∞ ∞) =
 ¡ (1) (1)   (2) (2)  1  1¢. By assumption, this c.d.f. has the Invariance Prop-
erty. As noted in Lemma 2, the copula for (12) inherits the MEV property from
. We may thus ignore the last but two dimensions of  and , and assume that
| | = 2 at no loss of generality. It remains to show that  (2) = £ (1)¤ for some
  0.
First, by Lemma 1, we may write
 (x) = exp ¡− ¡− ln (1) (1) − ln (2) (2)¢¢  (4)
where  is linearly homogenous and satisfies the properties necessary for  to be a
c.d.f. Since  by hypothesis is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with positive partials,
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 inherits these properties (except at the origin). To see this, note that  () ≡
− ln (−1 −2).
Second, by Proposition 1, the Invariance Property remains under any strictly
increasing transformation of the components. Hence, it is no loss of generality to apply
such a transformation so that  (1) is a Gumbel distribution,  (1)(1) = exp (−−1)
on R. By (1) we then have, for all  ∈ R,
ˆ (1) () = 11
Z 
−∞
 ( )1 ¡−− ln (2) ()¢ − =
ˆ (2) () = 12
Z 
−∞
 ( )2 ¡−− ln (2) ()¢  (2) () (2) ()
where  (2)  0 is the density of  (2) and 1 and 2 are the associated choice proba-
bilities. Diﬀerentiation with respect to  gives
1
1 ( )1
¡−− ln (2) ()¢ · − = 12 ( )2 ¡−− ln (2) ()¢ ·  (2) () (2) () 
or (since  ( )  0 and (x)  0 for all positive x ∈ R2):
 (2) () = 2
−1 ¡−− ln (2) ()¢
12 (−− ln (2) ()) · 
(2) () ∀ ∈ R (5)
Since  with  (1)(1) ≡ exp (−−1) and  (2) = £ (1)¤ for any   0 has
the Invariance Property (by the established suﬃciency claim of this theorem),  (2)
satisfies this equation, where 1 and 2 = 1−1 are the associated choice probabilities.
Suppose that ¯ (2) is a solution to (5) for 1 = ¯1 and 2 = ¯2, where (i) ¯1 and
¯2 = 1− ¯1 are the choice probabilities associated with ¯ , and (ii) ¯ (2) 6= £ (1)¤ for
all   0. We will show that no such solution ¯ (2) exists. For this purpose we first
show that, for any ¯1 ∈ (0 1) there exists some   0 such that ¯1 = 1 (), where
1 () and 2 () = 1 − 1 () are the choice probabilities under the c.d.f.  with
 (1)(1) ≡ exp (−−1) and  (2) = £ (1)¤. This can be established as follows. By
Theorem 1 in McFadden (1978),
1 () = 1 (1 ) (1 ) and 2 () =
2 (1 )
 (1 )
(set 1 = 0 and 2 = ln in McFadden’s equation (12)). By homogeneity of each 
one obtains
1− 1 ()
1 () =  ·
2 (1 (1 + )   (1 + ))
1 (1 (1 + )   (1 + ))
Moreover, since each  is continuous and positive on ∆ = ©y ∈ R2+ : 1 + 2 = 1ª
also the ratio21 is continuous and positive on∆. Since∆ is compact, there exists
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   0 such that  ≤ 2 (y) 1 (y) ≤  for all y ∈ ∆. Thus, for any ¯1 ∈ (0 1)
there exist an ¯  0 such that 1 (¯) = ¯1.
According to the Picard-Lindelöf Theorem (see e.g. Theorem 3.1 in Hale (1969)),
an ordinary diﬀerential equation such as (5) has a unique (local) solution through
any given point (0 0) ∈ R× (0 1), for 0 =  (2) (0) if
Ψ ( ) = 2
−1 (−− ln)
12 (−− ln) · 
defines a continuous function on R × (0 1) that is locally Lipschitz-continuous in
. Our function Ψ is continuously diﬀerentiable in  and thus also locally Lipschitz
continuous in . By uniqueness, the solution  (2) = £ (1)¤¯ and the hypothesized
alternative solution, ¯ (2) cannot intersect at any point (where their values are in
(0 1)). Hence, ¯ (2) () either lies above or below our solution for all  ∈ R. Assume
it always lies above;  (2)  ¯ (2) on R (the opposite case can be treated in the same
way). Define the random vector Z = (1 2) such that its c.d.f. is the above copula
. Let −() be the inverse of  (), for  = 1 2, and let ¯−(2) be the inverse of ¯ (2).8
Clearly ¯−(2)  −(2) on (0 1).
Let the random vector Y = (1 2) = (−(1)(1) −(2)(2)). Then Y has the
c.d.f.
 (y) =  £1 ≤  (1)(1) ∧ 2 ≤  (2)(2)¤ = ( (1)(1)  (2)(2))
Then 2 (¯) =  (2 ≥ 1) =  £−(2)(2) ≥ −(1)(1)¤ = ¯2 by the choice of ¯.
Similarly, the random vector Y¯ = (1 ¯2) = (−(1)(1) ¯−(2)(2)) has the c.d.f.
¯ (1 2) = ( (1)(1) ¯ (2)(2)). But since ¯−(2)  −(2), and Z has positive density
everywhere,
2 (¯) =  £−(2)(2) ≥ −(1)(1)¤   £¯−(2)(2) ≥ −(1)(1)¤ =  (¯2 ≥ 1) = ¯2
a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let X have the invariance property, i.e., ˆ () = ˆ for all
. It is suﬃcient to establish the proposition for the case when two alternatives, say
1 and 2, are merged via the maximum operation. Define  = 1∨2 It is suﬃcient
to show that  ( ≤  |  ∈ {1 2}) = ˆ (). But
 ( ≤  |  ∈ {1 2}) =  ([ ≤ ] ∧ [ ∈ {1 2}]) ( ∈ {1 2})
=
 ([ ≤ ] ∧ [ = 1]) +  ([ ≤ ] ∧ [ = 2])
1 + 2
=
 ( ≤  |  = 1) ( = 1) +  ( ≤  |  = 2) ( = 2)
1 + 2
=
1
1 + 2 ˆ
1 () + 21 + 2 ˆ
2 () = ˆ () 
8These inverse functions are well-defined since  has positive density on R2.
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